

SHORTER NOTES

THE MEANING OF ΠΑΝΑΩΡΙΟΣ AS APPLIED TO ACHILLES

In his article 'A Nonce-word in the *Iliad*' (*CQ* 35 [1985], 1–8) Maurice Pope argues against the usual modern interpretation of *παναώριος*, a Homeric *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον* applied by Achilles to himself at *Il.* 24.540, *sc.* 'of all-untimely fate', 'doomed to die young', and the like. The same is also the interpretation of the scholium *παντελῶς ἄωρον ἀποθανούμενον*, whilst Herodian and Eustathius, respectively with *κατὰ πάντα ἄωρον* and *πάντῃ ἄωρον*, do no more than paraphrase the force of *παν-* in the compound. Pope tries to establish instead the suitability of the meaning 'out of season', i.e. in what Achilles does or fails to do in general. His case rests on the ground of what is appropriate to or required by the context, since, as he himself shows, the word in itself can, on the analogy of closely related forms, notably the adjective *ἄωρος*, bear the meaning usually attributed to it, provided the context contains sufficient indication of a reference to death. Accordingly, the validity of his argument depends on his assessment of this context.

Pope recognises that throughout the last part of the *Iliad*, at least starting from the conversation between Achilles and his mother at 18.70ff., Achilles is fully aware of the nearness and unavoidability of his own death, and that 'from this point on Homer exploits the atmosphere of impending doom'. But after citing several passages in which the approach of Achilles' death is mentioned, Pope continues as follows.

These passages enhance the stature of Achilles and create an atmosphere of significance for the climax of the poem. But they do not undercut its human foundations. For they all occur in privileged circumstances. Achilles is alone with his goddess mother or his divine horse or the dying Hector or the body of Patroclus. No other mortal shares the knowledge. . . It would be quite contrary to Homer's practice for Priam, another human being and one who had no particular concern with Achilles' personal fate, to be given foreknowledge of it. Yet that is what would be implied if *παναώριος* meant doomed to die young.

These sentences could hardly have been written if another relevant and important passage had been borne in mind, that in which Achilles rejects the plea for mercy made by Priam's son Lycaon, *Il.* 21.99–113. He tells Lycaon that he himself, in spite of his high qualities and noble parentage, is doomed to die in battle. Line 110, *ἀλλ' ἔπι τοι καὶ ἐμοὶ θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή*, in itself need be no more than an unspecific statement of Achilles' mortality (cf. *Il.* 5.83, 16.334, 20.477). But he states further (111–13) that 'in the early, late or mid day someone will take away my life too in battle, striking me with a spear or an arrow'. This can only naturally be taken as expressing the same expectation as that stated by Achilles to his horse Xanthus at 19.421–2, 'I myself know well that it is my fate to perish here far from my father and mother'. Accordingly, any recollection of the Lycaon episode in the passage under consideration prepares us, precisely, for an allusion to Achilles' impending death. And it can hardly be denied that a contrast between the two episodes is part of the poet's conscious purpose, between the unsuccessful plea made by the son before the killing of Hector and the father's successful plea after it.

This consideration removes what Pope sees as one major obstacle to understanding the use of *παναώριος* as a reference by Achilles to his own early death. But it is certainly true that Achilles does not make this reference explicit. Instead he dwells on his present situation as it affects both Peleus and Priam. Therefore, one may well say that any intended reference is likely to be lost on Priam. However, the understanding

that can realistically be expected of Priam and the one that is expected of listener or reader may be two very different things, and the tension created by their difference may be a source of poetic strength.

Pope convincingly demonstrates the strong likelihood that *παναώριος* is not a traditional word, but a new coinage designed uniquely for its context. Quite frequently Homer provides an unambiguous explanation of new or unusual words, especially compound adjectives, in their immediate contexts (e.g. *Il.* 1.414–18, 2.212–13, 3.200–2, 387–8, 5.49–51, 305–6, 16.3–4). If there were such an explanation in the present case, there would be no doubt about the meaning of *παναώριος*. But consideration of its context does in fact reveal strong hints as to its meaning that have escaped Pope's notice.

The first half of the statement of the *κακόν* imposed upon Peleus is (538–40) *ὅττι οἱ οὐ τι παίδων ἐν μεγάροισι γονὴ γένητο κρείόντων, ἀλλ' ἓνα παῖδα τέκεν παναώριον*. This may at first seem to be no more than a way of saying 'he had no sons apart from me', except that clearly *παναώριον* adds something of significance, whatever it may be. But then *κρείόντων* also is likely to be more than merely conventional or otiose. The singular *κρείων*, meaning 'ruler', 'king', 'lord', or the like, is used forty-one times in the *Iliad* with proper names, but the plural of the same only twice, here and at 8.31, where *κρείόντων* denotes the gods in general. Thus its seemingly unconventional use here is likely to be contextually significant. Leaf and Bayfield comment on it 'almost proleptic, "to be rulers"', and Ameis and Hentze 'die nach Peleus' Tode die Herrschaft übernehmen konnten: die Herrschaft zu erben'. The same understanding is also stated by Faesi, Pierron and Monro. Ameis and Hentze go further and note that both *κρείόντων* and *παναώριον*, placed at the end of their respective phrases, are emphatic, to which one may add that they are therefore likely to be emphatically and significantly contrasted. The natural force of such a contrast is well expressed by Mazon's translation, 'il n'a point donné le jour à des enfants faits pour régner. Il n'y a engendré qu'un fils, voué à mourir avant l'heure'. Thus the contrast between *κρείόντων* and *παναώριον* constitutes a strong indication of the sense in which Achilles is 'all untimely', and this reinforces the natural inference from the wider context of the knowledge and expectation of Achilles' approaching death.

The rest of the statement of Peleus' *κακόν* is (540–2) *οὐδέ νυ τόν γε γηράσκοντα κομίζω, ἐπεὶ μάλα τηλόθι πάτρης ἤμαι ἐνὶ Τροίῃ σέ τε κήδων ἥδ' ἐσὰ τέκνα*. Pope sees this as a *non sequitur* if *παναώριος* means 'doomed to an early death', because 'the fact that he is soon to die in the future does not in any way stop Achilles looking after Peleus in the present.' But this is so only if one fails to recognise that Achilles' words clearly echo some of those used in his famous statement at 9.410–16 of his choice of fates – *εἰ μὲν κ' αὔθι μένων Τρώων πόλιν ἀμφιμάχωμαι, ὤλετο μὲν μοι νόστος... εἰ δέ κεν οἴκαδ' ἵκωμι φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν... οὐδέ κέ μ' ὦκα τέλος θανάτοιο κιχείη*. Achilles' continued presence and activity at Troy entail his irrevocable choice of the fate which excludes the possibility of returning to his father, so that in this context to say he is not now looking after his father is as good as saying he never will. And this being the case, it is not irrelevant to point out that, even if it was not part of the poet's conscious intention here, there is in the *Iliad* a seemingly conventional association between inability to pay the *θρέπτρα* owed to one's parents and being short-lived, *μιννθάδιος*, the word applied by Achilles to himself at 1.352. The same statement is made twice, about two minor figures who are killed in battle by Telamonian Ajax – *οὐδὲ τοκεῦσι θρέπτρα φίλοις ἀπέδωκε, μιννθάδιος δέ οἱ αἰὼν ἔπλεθ' ὑπ' Αἴαντος μεγαθύμου δουρὶ δαμέντι*, which is applied, with obvious pathetic force in both cases, to Simoësius at 4.477–9 and to Hippothoüs at 17.301–3.

I leave it to others to judge whether it is 'in accord with Achilles' character as we see it elsewhere in the *Iliad* for him to run himself down by calling himself *παναώριος* in the sense of a misfit or failure', as Pope claims. My concern is simply to set out the considerations that lead one to accept the usual interpretation of the word, and also perhaps to shed some new light by exploring them more fully than has been done in the commentaries.

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ΜΑΡΙΚΑΣ

A. C. Cassio has recently pointed out¹ that *Μαρικᾶς*, the name which Eupolis applied to the demagogue Hyperbolus, is a transliteration of the Old Persian word *marika*^h. In fact, a Persian origin of *μαρικᾶς* was suspected long ago. The seventeenth-century English scholar Edward Bernard, whose notes were used by J. Alberti in his edition of Hesychius,² connected *μαρικᾶς* with the Modern Persian *mardekeh*, which literally means 'a little man' and has the connotation 'a vile person', 'a scoundrel'.³ A. Meineke followed Bernard's derivation of *μαρικᾶς* from Persian,⁴ as did K. Latte in his recent edition of Hesychius.⁵ These references should be added to Cassio's citation of E. Maass' quotation of K. F. Geldner's opinion.⁶

One aspect of Hesychius' note

Μαρικᾶν· κίναιδον. οἱ δὲ ὑποκόρισμα παιδίου ἄρρενος βαρβαρικόν

(*βαρβαρικόν* Meineke: *βαρβαρικοῦ* cod. Marcianus gr. 622 (s. XV), the *codex unicus* upon which Hesychius' text rests) deserves further consideration:

It is clear that *marika*^h, a contracted form of **mariyaka*^h, 'little man',⁷ is an *ὑποκόρισμα παιδίου ἄρρενος βαρβαρικόν*, a 'barbarian diminutive' of a male child'; however, it is much less clear that the Old Persian *marika*^h or its Greek transliteration *μαρικᾶς* ever meant *κίναιδος*.⁹ Hyperbolus was accused of many faults, but never so far as we know of being a *κίναιδος*, nor is this the meaning of the cognate Modern

¹ *CQ* 35 (1985), 38–42.

² *Hesychii Lexicon* (Leiden, 1766), ii. col. 541.

³ Cf. S. Haïm, *New Persian-English Dictionary* (Tehran, 1936), ii.864. In Modern Persian *mard* means 'man', and *-ak* and *-ekeh* are diminutive suffixes.

⁴ *Fragmenta Comitorum Graecorum* (Berlin, 1839), i.137.

⁵ *Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon* (Copenhagen, 1966), ii.629.

⁶ *Festgabe Hugo Blümner* (Zürich, 1914), pp. 267–71.

⁷ Cf. R. G. Kent, *Old Persian, Grammar, Texts, Lexicon*² (New Haven, 1953), p. 202.

⁸ Cassio, *op. cit.*, 38, translates *ὑποκόρισμα* as 'term of endearment', but there is no evidence that the abusive and contemptuous *μαρικᾶς* was ever used this way. Surely in this context *ὑποκόρισμα* means simply 'diminutive'.

⁹ Cassio, *op. cit.*, 38, notes that *βάταλος*, which Demosthenes' nurse bestowed on him as a nickname, also meant *κίναιδος*, but the circumstances regarding the multiple meanings of *βάταλος*, which were extensively reviewed by Meineke, *op. cit.*, pp. 333–6, are quite different from those involving *μαρικᾶς* and no more provide an analogy for a word literally meaning 'little man' acquiring the sense *κίναιδος* than does either of the Americanisms cited by Cassio in n. 6.

To my mind the least improbable way by which *μαρικᾶς* might have acquired the meaning *κίναιδος* would be by assimilation with the cognate Greek *μείραξ*, which can have this meaning (Lucian, *Soloec.* 5, [Draco Stratonicensis], *Περὶ μέτρων ποιητικῶν*, p. 18.21–2 Hermann). However, there would be no direct evidence to support this hypothesis.